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1. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
CAHVE Council of Europe ad hoc Committee of experts on legal, operational 
and technical standards for e-voting 
 
CDDG European Committee on Democracy and Governance 
 
CDMSI Steering Committee on Media and Information Society 
 




EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
 
EMB Electoral Management Body 
 
EPB Electronic Ballot Printers 
 
ERM Election Risk Management 
 
e-voting electronic voting 
 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
 
International IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
 
i-voting internet voting 
 
NVT New Voting Technologies 
 
OSCE/ODIHR  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
 
PCOS Precinct counting optical scanners 
 
PP Protection Profile 
 
Rec(2004)11 Council of Europe’s Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Committee 
of Ministers to member States on legal, operational and technical 
standards for e-voting   
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The need to formally update the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting (Rec(2004)11) to 
reflect past experiences as well as recent technology and legal developments was stated in 
the 2012 biannual review meeting. It was further confirmed by countries', NGOs' and 
international organizations' representatives in two consecutive gatherings: a meeting of 
experts held in Vienna in December 2013 and the October 2014 biannual review meeting 
held in Bregenz.  
Following up on these demands, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
decided the creation of an "Ad hoc Committee of Experts on E-Voting" (CAHVE), whose task 
is to update the Recommendation. The process should be guided by a needs assessment of 
stakeholders. 
The present report discusses feedback provided by designated experts from 18 member 
States and 3 participant institutions who replied to a questionnaire on the scope and format 
of the update circulated by end-June 2015. Respondents have direct experience with 
studying, implementing or supervising e-voting. 
Questions 1 to 5 of the questionnaire deal with broader issues like the definition of e-voting, 
the role and responsibilities of state authorities in charge of elections, the structure and type 
of content of the provisions of the Recommendation and the notion of risk. The 
modifications proposed under these questions received a majority of approvals. Negative 
and alternative opinions underline aspects which need to be taken into account. Questions 6 
to 8 were open-ended and aimed at gathering feedback on additional preliminary questions 
that can be envisaged, on expected results and on other proposals.  
After analysing the replies received, the report presents conclusions on the scope and 
structure of the update and proposes a number of decisions to be discussed and decided at 
the 28-29 October 2015 CAHVE meeting in Strasbourg.  
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3. BACKGROUND 
The Council of Europe’s "Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting" and its 
explanatory memorandum were adopted on 30 September 2004. In 2010 two 
complementary documents, with less stringent effect, were approved: the Guidelines on 
transparency and the Guidelines on certification2. The three documents have served as legal 
benchmarks to countries and institutions in the region and even beyond when introducing, 
operating and evaluating e-voting systems. 
Following the conclusions of both 2012 and 2014 biannual review meetings as well as those 
of an experts' meeting held in Vienna in December 20133, the Committee of Ministers 
decided in 2015 to set up an "Ad hoc committee of experts on legal, operational and 
technical standards for e-voting" (CAHVE)4. Its mandate is to prepare a draft 
Recommendation updating Rec(2004)11 in the light of recent technical and legal 
developments related to e-enabled elections in the Council of Europe member States, as 
well as its explanatory memorandum. The committee is composed of national delegates 
from election management bodies (EMBs) of Council of Europe members States as well as of 
representatives from Council of Europe and international institutions. 
In line with previous discussions and decisions,  CAHVE's mandate is to enhance and further 
develop the existing Recommendation rather than to rewrite it. The updating work should 
mainly consist in redressing the identified flaws of the Recommendation, in taking advantage 
of recent experiences with e-voting in the region and in addressing the implications of 
emerging technical concepts and solutions. The process of updating should be guided by a 
needs assessment of stakeholders, taking particular account of the views of member States, 
but also of non-governmental stakeholders.  
A two-step approach has been adopted. In the first (current) phase, discussions focus on the 
clarification of the scope and format of the future Recommendation. After completion of the 
first phase, work will be undertaken to update the individual provisions of the 
Recommendation and the explanatory memorandum.  
A questionnaire prepared by the Council of Europe’s leading expert was circulated among 
CAHVE delegates by end-June 2015, with the aim of gathering their opinion on issues of 
content and structure that need to be decided during the first phase of work, before the 
actual update. The questionnaire is structured around questions related to the scope of the 
                                                     
2 The three instruments can be found on the e-voting dedicated page of the Council of Europe’s Division of Electoral 
Assistance and Census: <http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/themes/evoting/default_en.asp>  
[Last accessed 07/10/2015] 
3 We refer mainly to the following documents: 
- The report of the fourth biannual review meeting held in Bregenz/Austria on 11 July 2012; 
- The report of an experts' meeting on a possible update of the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 
organized in Vienna by the Federal Ministry of the Interior of Austria on 19 December 2013; 
- Our report to the Council of Europe on a possible update of the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 
presented in the experts' meeting on 19 December 2013 in Vienna; 
- The report of the fifth biannual review meeting held in Bregenz/Austria on 28 October 2014.  
The reports and additional relevant information can be found on the e-voting dedicated page of the Council of Europe’s 
Division of Electoral Assistance and Census (see footnote 2 above)  
4 The "Terms of Reference of the Ad hoc committee of experts on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting" 
can be found on the e-voting dedicated page of the Council of Europe’s Division of Electoral Assistance and Census (see 
footnote 2 above) 
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future recommendation (questions 1, 2 and 5 on the definition of e-voting, the role of EMBs 
and on risk policy) and to the structure and categories of standards (questions 3 and 4). 
Finally, questions 6 to 8 provide an open space for respondents to express their proposals, 
expectations, and concerns. 
Nineteen (19) national delegates5 and representatives from three (3) participant institutions6 
replied to the questionnaire. The author wishes to thank each of them for their valuable 
contribution. 
The feedback received by respondents is summarised and analysed in chapter 3. Conclusions 
on the scope and format of the update are presented in chapter 4. Finally, a number of key 
proposals to be discussed during the CAHVE meeting on 28-29 October are presented in 
chapter 5.  
The full text of the questionnaire and of the replies received is included in Annex III attached 
to this report7. Annexes I and II at the end of this document present an overview of results 
by question and by respondent. Opinions expressed by a small group of independent e-
voting experts consulted during the preparation of the questionnaire have been taken into 
account and are mentioned as such8.  
Questions 1 to 5 of the questionnaire did not provide a definition of the terms used (e.g. 
ballot scanner, EMBs, vendors, layers, risk) because they were aimed at gathering as many 
opinions as possible. The different meanings to which respondents referred are discussed 
when analysing the replies (chapter 3). Conclusions and proposals presented in this report 
(chapters 4 and 5) clarify the specific meaning of the terms employed.  
The Recommendation Rec(2004)11 contains three broad recommendations (i. to iii.), a 
number of definitions and three Appendices (I to III) which contain the detailed provisions. 
The recommendations are:  
(i) e-voting shall respect all the principles of democratic elections and referendums and be as 
reliable and secure as democratic elections and referendums which do not involve the use of 
electronic means;  
(ii) the interconnection between the legal, operational and technical aspects of e-voting, as 
set out in the Appendices, has to be taken into account when applying the Recommendation 
and  
(iii) member states should consider reviewing their relevant domestic legislation in the light 
of this Recommendation and within the limits stated by recommendation (iv).  
The recommendations refer to the Appendices, i.e. to the legal (I) and operational (II) 
standards and technical requirements (III). Admittedly the updating effort should mainly be 
                                                     
5 Armenia, Austria, Belgium (both federal and region Brussels), Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Belgium federal and 
regional representatives expressed differing opinions and their replies have been assessed separately. 
6 The Council of Europe Committee on Democracy and Governance (CDDG), the Council of Europe Steering Committee on 
Media and Information Society (CDMSI) and international IDEA. CDDG did not present a consolidated reply but three 
differing replies from three different members, which have been considered separately in this report. 
7 Some of the replies have been slightly modified to harmonise content presentation. Modifications only concern style and 
format.  
8 The consulted experts, mainly from the academia, included Jordi Barrat, Douglas Jones, Robert Krimmer, Kristina Lemon, 
Melanie Volkamer and Gregor Wenda. 
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aimed at the provisions found in the appendices. Depending on the modifications introduced 
in the Appendices, the three recommendations may also require adjustments.  
4. ANALYSIS OF THE REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
4.1 Question 1 on the definition of e-voting 
4.1.1 Overview 
Should e-voting be re-defined to include, in addition to electronic voting machines and 
internet voting, also ballot scanners? 
The 2004 Rec(2004)11 defines e-voting as “an e-election or e-referendum that involves the 
use of electronic means in at least the casting of the vote”9 covering e-votes cast on e-voting 
machines or from a computer and through internet to an e-voting server. The accent is put 
on the electronic format of the ballot. 
The 2013 OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for the observation of new voting technologies (NVT)-a 
synonym for electronic voting- defines e-voting as “the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) applied to the casting and counting of votes”10. In this 
case e-voting covers also counting machines which are not used to "cast" the vote (there is 
no interaction at all between the voter and the machine). 
The two e-voting definitions being different, it seems necessary to take the opportunity of 
the update to either align Rec(2004)11's definition with the one proposed by ODIHR, or to 
try at least to bring them as closer as possible and indicate the remaining differences.  
Reasons for this are twofold. First, both documents have the same geographic scope and 
aligning them would contribute to clarifying the standards applicable in the region. Second, 
the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook refers to the detailed provisions of the Recommendation and 
Guidelines on certification and transparency as "the legal benchmark" (together with OSCE's, 
broader, principles) for evaluating e-voting systems. To be coherent, terms used in both 
documents need to have the same meaning. 
The question proposes an extension of the current definition of e-voting to include ballot 
scanners. The question however does not give a definition of the ballot scanner. 
As shown in figure 1, a majority of respondents agreed with an extension of e-voting to 
cover ballot scanners. Specifically, 18 respondents answered yes (equivalent to 72%), 6 
answered no (24%), and 1 answered “other” (4%).  
The analysis of the replies shows that respondents had different definitions of "ballot 
scanners" in mind when replying to the question. In this regard, the extent of the agreement 
on the inclusion of ballot scanners used in voting precincts to record paper votes and tally 
and count them may be even larger than what appears in figure 1 (see 4.1.3 below).  
 
                                                     
9 p. 8, Rec(2004)11 
10 p. 4, OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for the observation of NVT 




4.1.2 Positive answers 
The main reason argued in favour of extending the current definition of e-voting is to make it 
"complete and detailed". The following proposals for a new definition of e-voting are made: 
1. the use of ICT to cast, record, count the votes; 
2. the use of electronic means to cast the vote (e-voting machines, internet voting and 
other) and to count them or to process paper ballots (ballot scanners and other); 
3. the use of ICT to cast the vote and to transform paper ballots into electronic ones; 
4. the use of ICT either to cast the vote or to scan the ballot; 
5. e-voting covers the full scope of NVT: ballot scanning, direct recording electronic 
voting systems (DRE), Internet voting, hybrid forms of NVT and voting management 
systems; 
6. a definition based on OSCE/ODIHR 2013 Handbook on the observation of NVT; 
7. an extension of e-voting to include e-counting; 
8. One national representative suggested to extending the notion of e-voting to cover 
all e-enabled processes of the electoral cycle. However this opinion does not seem to 
be shared by other respondents. 
Respondents introduced the following caveats: 
1. The Recommendation should cover ballot scanners only when used to obtain binding 
election results. Their use to produce indicative, preliminary, non-binding results is 
not subject to the Recommendation; 
2. The Recommendation should distinguish between:  
a. ballot scanning at the polling station where the voter still ‘casts’ the ballot 
paper directly into the scanning device and may optionally receive direct 
feedback from the machine on who they voted for, for review or verification 
purposes. In this case the voter marks her choice on mark sense paper ballot 
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and then cast the vote by feeding the mark sense paper ballot into the 
scanner or e-ballot box. After mark sense paper ballot is inserted, the e-ballot 
box records and tallies votes by referring to marks made by voters. In this 
case, by using special machine-readable paper ballot, the ballot scanner 
enables to combine the phases of voting and tallying in an electronic manner 
at the polling station or another location which is under the supervision of 
electoral management bodies’ officials; and  
b. central counting systems where counting is done by scanners without there 
being any interaction between the scanner and the voter, and raises specific 
concerns; 
 This caveat is discussed in the following section on negative and other answers. 
3. The Recommendation should only cover e-voting as used during elections and votes. 
The use of ICT in other participatory processes, such as the e-collecting of signatures 
for initiatives or referendums for example, is not covered; 
4. As mentioned by independent experts, covering different types of e-voting means 
that a number of standards will be specific to each type.  
With respect to caveats 1 and 3, the current definition of e-voting refers to the use of 
electronic means in e-elections or e-referendums.  This implies that the results obtained 
through e-voting are official ones (with binding effect). It also means that only elections and 
referendums are covered. E-collecting and other forms of participation fall outside its scope.  
As the discussion on the future structure of the Recommendation (under question 3 below) 
will show, there is consensus on caveat 4.  
4.1.3 Negative answers and other arguments 
Referring to the OSCE/ODIHR definition of NVT which mentions the "counting", one 
respondent concluded that the definition in Rec(2004)11 already covers ballot scanners. A 
reference to pure e-counting is however missing in the current definition of e-voting in 
Rec(2004)11.  
A similar opinion interprets the current definition, namely “the use of electronic means in at 
least the casting of the vote” as covering all types of electronic means which can be used in 
all stages of the voting process, including ballot scanners. However, what is meant by the 
definition is that the casting of the vote by electronic means is a "sine qua non" condition. 
Despite being "labelled" as negative answers, these two opinions do not oppose to 
extending the definition of e-voting to ballot scanners but hold that this is already the case.  
The four opinions reported below contest the inclusion of ballot scanners under the label of 
e-voting. Their analysis shows that opposition relates to scanners used for e-counting alone. 
By contrast, ballot scanning at the polling station where the voter still "casts" the ballot 
paper directly into the scanning device and may optionally receive direct feedback from the 
machine on who they voted for, for review or verification purposes, is expressly or tacitly 
accepted as a form of e-voting. We will refer to them as ballot scanners offering interaction 
voter-machine. The distinction between scanners used for e-counting alone and scanners 
offering interaction voter-machine was also mentioned in the previous section (see caveat 2, 
above). 
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One argument underlines the difference between the casting of an electronic ballot and the 
e-counting of paper ballots. In the first case, issues related to vote secrecy and voter's trust 
in the correct handling of the vote by the system are present. The second case is allegedly 
different and therefore should be regulated differently. This respondent would agree to 
extend e-voting to cover ballot scanners provided this is done in a separate chapter of the 
Recommendation, and reference is made to e-counting's specific challenges: the integrity of 
the tally and the related distribution of seats. Clearly this opinion refers to the use of ballot 
scanners for counting purposes alone without there being any interaction between the voter 
and the machine. The case of ballot scanners used to receive mark sense paper ballots 
directly from the voter as proposed by some definitions is apparently not envisaged.  
A second opinion opposes to the extension which is considered as a step backwards because 
according to the respondent the principle of electronic voting is to do away with all 
"manual" interventions between the voters and their casting of the vote. The author admits 
however that some sort of ballot scanning can be considered to be e-voting such as scanners 
introduced in Belgium, which, the author considers, are "an integrated example".11 In this 
case an extension of the definition to include ballot scanners where there is interaction 
voter-machine is accepted. 
A third argument says that the Recommendation needs to concentrate on e-issued votes as 
an alternative way of casting a ballot along with traditional paper-based voting. In this view, 
the scanning of paper ballots is considered to be outdated and only to be considered as a 
temporary, transitional mean of counting votes while switching from paper to e-ballots.  
The forth respondent distinguishes between e-voting and e-counting technologies, the 
former being about cast-as-intended, and the second, about counted-as-cast. The 
implication is that only e-voting or cast-as-intended issues should be dealt by Rec(2004)11.  
The case of ballot scanners used by the voter to cast her vote, where there is interaction 
voter-machine, was apparently not envisaged in the last two opinions. 
4.2 Question 2 on the role of EMBs 
4.2.1 Overview 
While leaving detailed definitions to the parts specifically dealing with issues such as 
transparency, auditing, verifiability, etc. would you agree on adding a broad provision 
reminding that the conduct of elections and referendums is the responsibility of EMBs / 
state authorities, in the updated Recommendation? 
When considering the introduction of e-voting and contracting e-voting vendors and service 
providers, state authorities in charge of elections and referendums (hereinafter EMBs) face 
the need, among others, to define their own responsibilities. There is and interest, also from 
countries outside the region, that the Recommendation clarifies EMBs' responsibilities when 
e-voting is used.12 
                                                     
11 In this case reference is apparently made to scanners used to record paper votes, where the voter "casts" her paper vote 
in the scanner. 
12 For an example, consider the EU-UNDP representative's opinion expressed at the fifth review meeting of Rec(2004)11, 
October 2014, Bregenz.  
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Several standards dispersed throughout Rec(2004)11 already address specific aspects of the 
relationship between EMBs and entities contracted to provide e-voting services (see with 
this respects the transparency requirements). However, a general provision on the specific 
role and responsibilities of EMBs is currently missing. 
The question asks whether there is agreement on adding such a general provision reminding 
that the conduct of e-elections and e-referendums is entirely the responsibility of the EMB in 
charge.  
As illustrated by figure 2, the majority of respondents would agree on including such a new 
provision. 18 respondents would be in favour (72%), 2 against (8%), while 4 suggested 




4.2.2 Positive answers 
Opinions favouring a new provision specific to the role of EMBs argued the following: 
Regulate the relationship EMB-private vendor 
1. A code of conduct ... is currently missing. This concerns two essential areas:  
a. the selection of the vendor 
b. the relationship between the vendor and election officials during elections; 
2. The responsibility for conducting the whole process of elections and referenda and 
ensuring compliance with international and national principles on e-voting lays with 
the state authority and cannot be outsourced to private companies. This contributes 
to ensuring neutrality and openness to public scrutiny (transparency), which privates 
cannot sufficiently provide. It is absolute and urgent to focus on this; 
3. The EMB should be the owner of the source code;  
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4. One important factor attesting independence is disclosure of source code with a view 
to promote technical improvements. This however could be restricted to 
independent trusted and trustworthy experts to avoid potential abuses. 
Increase EMBs' e-voting-related capacities 
5. State authorities must have internal technical and legal expertise to manage alone, if 
necessary, the process of e-voting; 
6. EMBs should conduct continuous updates and improvements both in the fields of 
project management, personal recruitment and in the field of security and 
maintenance of e-voting systems with the aim of keeping the control of the project 
over time; 
7. EMBs should diminish the usage of outsource with respect to major components of 
electoral processes. 
8. Authorities must be able to monitor technical issues and hold their suppliers to 
account13; 
9. The State authority should preferably be also responsible for compiling, maintaining 
and publishing electoral registers. 
Reference to national specificities 
10. The responsibility of state authorities may be taken as a subject in a very broad 
sense. A broad standard on state authorities in electronic voting could be added. The 
issue is primarily regulated by national legislations. Those may differ from one 
country to another. Such differences need to be taken into account. A reference to 
national legislation on topics such as electoral legislation, public administration 
legislation, public procurement legislation, etc., could be included in the new text; 
11. A reference to the CoE member states´ legislation in force in this matter (electoral 
legislation, public administration and public procurement legislation etc.) could be 
part of the new text; 
12. Due to their complex nature, e-vote systems may involve third parties, e.g. net 
providers. A large part of the communication and its integrity lies in this case on such 
(usually private) providers. Similar concerns relate to postal voting at least when 
private postal companies are involved. A recommendation, similar to Venice 
Commission's recommendation "postal voting should be allowed only where the 
postal service is safe and reliable" may be introduced for services provided by third 
parties. State authorities exercise their responsibility by evaluating and declaring 
such service providers as "fit for e-vote". 
4.2.3 Negative answers and other arguments 
1. One opinion holds that the Recommendation already refers to the obligation of 
Member States to ensure the conduct of elections and referenda and there is no 
need to add the proposed clarification on the specific responsibility of the electoral 
authorities.  
                                                     
13 The respondent references p.32 of the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook mentioned above, which states that “[vendors] should not 
replace any relevant functions of the electoral administration, which should remain in full control of the electoral 
process”.  
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2. Another similar one refers to standard 28 in Appendix I (legal standards), Part B 
(Procedural safeguards), Section III on Reliability and Security as already covering the 
responsibility of EMBs. This standard reads: the member State's authorities shall 
ensure the reliability and security of the e-voting system; 
3. Another suggests that the responsibility of the authority is to be covered by audits or 
other independent external controls. Such controls need to be maintained and 
reinforced. Same would apply to transparency and the possibility of verifying results.  
4. An "other" respondent would prefer to approach this issue from the point of view of 
finding guarantees for transparency, audit, accountability, verifiability etc. 
4.3 Question 3 on the structure of the future Recommendation 
4.3.1 Overview 
Question 3.1 
Do you agree on putting only high-level concise provisions that are persistent over time in 
the Recommendation itself? The Recommendation would be stable. 
The current Recommendation lacks homogeneity. Some provisions are quite high-level, 
others are too detailed, and the nesting between high-level and lower-level / detailed 
provisions is not made clear. As a result, applying the Recommendation as "one block" to a 
specific e-voting case has proved difficult if not impossible. Question 3.1 asks whether there 
is agreement that the Recommendation itself should contain only high-level and concise 
standards that are persistent over time. 
Question 3.2 
Do you agree on organising the other detailed standards in separate, complementary layers 
or documents that need to be regularly updated?  
If so, question 3.2 follows, the non-core standards could be put in lower-level documents, 
such as Guidelines, which can be more easily and frequently updated.  
It is understood that the different documents (the Recommendation and the lower-level 
instruments) are interrelated and interdependent. The relationship between higher-level / 
general provisions and lower-level / detailed ones as well as their nesting shall be made clear 
in the respective documents. 
Almost all respondents answered favourably to identifying a set of key high-level standards 
to be included in the Recommendation (see figure 3.1). 21 respondents answered yes to 
question 3.1 (84%), 3 answered no (12%), while 1 respondent offered an alternative solution 
(4%).  




Following from the previous answers, the majority of respondents argued in favour of 
organising specific standards in complementary layers or documents (see figure 3.2). In 
particular, 20 respondents were in favour of the proposal of question 3.2 (80%), 3 did not 
show support (12%), and 2 respondents proposed alternative approaches (8%).  
 
Figure 3.2 
4.3.2 Positive answers 
Most respondents did not elaborate further on this. A few arguments are however provided: 
1. the Recommendation should include only a set of high-level standards that cover 
a. legal standards; 
b. architecture; 
c. security;  
d. audit and verification provisions. 
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2. A special body could be set up to supervise each of the layers; 
3. Detailed recommendations mainly of operational and technical nature should be 
organized in separate, complementary layers or documents which can be revisited. 
4.3.3 Negative answers and other arguments 
1. One opinion agrees that the Recommendation needs to be restructured but 
disagrees with the envisaged reorganisation, implying that all existing provisions 
should remain in the Recommendation. However, a distinction should be operated 
between: 
a. provisions that remain stable over time; 
b. provisions that are general and apply to all types of e-voting considered; 
c. provisions specific to e-voting in controlled environments and 
d. provisions specific to e-voting in uncontrolled environments. 
2. A similar opinion states that the Recommendation must not only be a legal text. It 
must also cover technical principles and include explanatory chapters. The 
respondent agrees with the distinction between the different types of requirements 
but insists that they all need to be kept in the Recommendation and its Appendices, 
thus preserving the unity of the text.  
Underlying both previous and other opinions is the fear that standards which are pulled out 
of the Recommendation itself and put in lower-level instruments risk not being respected. 
However, it should be reminded that the Recommendation itself is not mandatory. Together 
with related Guidelines they are part of the soft law.  
3. One alternative proposal states that it is wishful to have both high-level and detailed 
provisions in the Recommendation, but layered. If we go for a high-level Rec only, it 
would be difficult for the countries to "translate" them into concrete advice for their 
specific case.  
It is unclear what, according to this opinion, prevents countries from looking at provisions 
contained in the lower level documents related to the Recommendation. 
4. The second alternative proposal states that there is a need to organise the standards 
in multiple levels. This could be done within the same document or in different 
documents. High-level requirements should be stable. Low-level ones need frequent 
updates. It suggests a possible distinction between "mandatory" (higher level) and 
optional (lower levels) standards.  
Despite being labelled as "other", this is a positive opinion. The proposed distinction is 
certainly not between mandatory and optional (the recommendation itself being only soft 
law and as thus optional) but between generally applicable provisions contained in the 
Recommendation and more specific ones contained in the related documents and applicable 
only to certain aspects or to a certain voting method for instance.  
5. However, the same argument follows, it is necessary first to examine which level of 
detail is actually required for the new Recommendation. Additionally, outdating can 
be avoided, even when aiming at a high level of detail, if reference is made to stable 
standards and techniques rather than to technology.  
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The proposal is actually to decide on the level of detail of the new Recommendation and the 
suggestion is to keep only high-level provisions in the Recommendation itself.  
6. One opinion opposes to the proposed modification and maintains that the current 
Recommendation (and accompanying Memorandum) does not lack homogeneity and 
is very clear. This opinion argues that the current Recommendation is technology 
neutral and does not need regular updates. The risk with lower-level documents, this 
respondent says, is that updates would create a degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability.  
The opinion that the Recommendation is very clear is not shared. Indeed the opposite is 
considered to be the case, reason why the updating works have been undertaken as 
explained at the beginning of this document. Furthermore, introducing maintenance and 
updating policy to allow for the regular update of standards whenever necessary (following 
developments in the legal or technology fields or in our understanding of e-voting) is one of 
the objectives of the current work.  
7. The same respondent holds that a "certified Common Criteria Protection Profile 
based on the technical Appendix III..." is what is needed. However, this is not 
appropriately done by the Council of Europe and should be left to a specialised 
organisation or group of organisations, such as the German "Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik" or the French "Agence Nationale de la Sécurité 
des Systèmes d'Information".  
To be able to build a Protection Profile based on the requirements of the Recommendation, 
these should be well expressed, complete and up-to-date. This is not the case today reason 
why an updating effort is undertaken. 
4.4 Question 4 on the categories of requirements 
Do you agree on a reorganisation of the Recommendation and classification in new 
categories which include functional requirements (what an e-voting system is required to 
do), performance requirements (how an e-voting system should do what it is required to do) 
and testing and evaluation criteria? 
The current Recommendation distinguishes between legal, operational and technical 
standards. Past experiences and critique show that the distinction is not practical when 
building or evaluating e-voting systems.14  
In line with previous criticism, suggestions and practical experiences, question 4 suggests 
that the standards could be organised under new categories which may include, for instance: 
 functional requirements (what an e-voting system is required to do);  
 performance requirements (how an e-voting system should do what it is required to 
do); and 
 testing and evaluation criteria.  
                                                     
14 For an overview see critiques reported in our 2013 Report (see fn. 3 above) 
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Standards found both in the Recommendation and in the Guidelines would be taken into 




The great majority of respondents agree with such a proposal (see figure 4). 18 interviewees 
answered positively to it (72%), two answered negatively (8%) and five offered alternatives 
(20%).  
4.4.1 Positive answers 
The following arguments were presented: 
1. Referring to their reply to question 3.1, a responded suggested that the mentioned 
types of standards could be read as follows: 
a. provisions that are general and apply to all types of e-voting considered: this 
is what the system is required to do; 
b. provisions specific to e-voting in controlled environments + provisions specific 
to e-voting in uncontrolled environments: this is how the system should do 
what it is required to do 
c. add the considerations on security, especially for e-voting in uncontrolled 
environments. 
It is unclear, for example, why it would not be possible to have generally applicable 
provisions on how an e-voting system should do what it is required to do. Or, in other words, 
why performance (how a system should do what it is required to do) should be only specific 
to different types of e-voting (as point b says).  
Those who answered positively also introduced some caveats: 
2. The need to keep the legal standards; 
It should be stressed that what is considered here is not to introduce totally new 
requirements instead of the existing ones, but to organise and nest differently the existing 
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requirements. Legal standards should be kept - no doubt about it, but may be organised 
differently. One possibility is that they are integrated into the group of requirements that 
clarify what e-voting is required to do.  
3. The need to keep in mind that functional and performance requirements can be 
quite different between various e-voting solutions. It might be useful to have a 
common part applicable to all e-votings and, separately, functional and performance 
requirements specific to each e-vote solution;  
This will certainly be taken into account when doing the update. 
4. That the reorganisation should bring clarity and contribute to uniformity among 
member States. 
4.4.2 Negative answers and other arguments 
Two respondents opposed to the proposed reorganisation.  
1. The first agreed on modifications in case of lacunae, omissions and redundancies but 
held that any alternative classification, as the one proposed by the question, will be 
arbitrary and open to criticism.  
2. The second opposition held that functional requirements cannot be included in the 
Recommendation because no one size fits all. Functional requirements furthermore 
reflect societal realities which are not included in the Recommendation either.  
Four countries presented additional or alternative opinions.  
3. One suggested, in addition to the proposed requirements, to emphasise the legal 
aspects of e-voting and to provide for clear priority rules applicable if a vote can be 
casted on more than one channel as well as to address the legal consequences of 
technical failure of a voting system; 
4. Another opinion suggested keeping the current classification and extending it as 
follows: 
a. legal: keep  
b. operational: extended to include functional requirements and evaluation 
criteria  
c. technical: extended to cover testing and performance requirements 
The exact place of each requirement will be considered when doing the update. It is 
important to have a good nesting of higher-level and lower-level requirements so that they 
are easily understood and implemented.  
5. One respondent says that the aim should be to have as few individual documents as 
possible for e-voting because of difficulties to update them.  
The main objective of separating provisions in different layers (see question 3) is to facilitate 
the update of those provisions that need more frequent updates (to be found in lower / 
easier-to-update layers). 
6. Another respondent agrees with restructuring, but proposes a different one including 
objectives (top level), principles and recommendations. In doing so the ambition is to 
facilitate mapping.  
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This can be interpreted as a positive reply. More explanation on the proposed structure is 
needed.  
4.5 Question 5 on the notion of risk  
Do you agree on the inclusion of the notions of risk and risk assessment in the updated 
(hard-core) Recommendation? 
The current provisions of the Recommendation are formulated in absolute terms (e.g. the 
organisation of e-voting shall secure…, voters shall be able to…). A number of detailed 
requirements of Rec(2004)11 formulated in absolute terms are impossible to respect. 15 
Such impossibility is not specific to e-voting but also exists in other traditional voting 
methods. As an independent expert explains, requirements such as "it shall be impossible 
for an unauthorized person to cast a ballot" are not well-formulated, impossible being a very 
strong word.  Identical twins can be extremely difficult to distinguish, particularly if they have 
inherited adermatoglyphia (a lack of fingerprints).   
The question explores the possibility of considering the provisions to be included in the 
Recommendation from the perspective that 100% guarantees or 0% risks do not exist in the 
real world and even less so in an e-voting context.  
This is already envisaged in the current Recommendation which does not say that e-voting 
should be totally reliable and secure but says that "e-voting shall be as reliable and secure as 
democratic elections and referendums which do not involve the use of electronic means" 
(recommendation i).  
Paragraph 138 of the Explanatory Memorandum hints at the following interpretation: as 
reliable and secure as other voting methods means that, as for other voting channels, 
systematic attacks should be prevented. This is based on the assumption that systematic 
attacks have the potential to affect results.  
Despite such intentions of the current Recommendation - which reflects reality and 
experience with other voting methods - several standards are formulated in absolute terms 
suggesting that an e-voting system may be able to offer absolute guarantees of 100% 
successful performance, security, etc. So recognising this and introducing the notion of risk 
and risk assessment would not be new elements but a clarification of existing provisions.  
The question does not say how the notions of risk and risk assessment will be introduced.  
A majority of respondents expressed support for the inclusion of the concept of risk and risk 
assessment (Figure 5). In particular, 18 respondents answered yes (72%), 5 respondents 
answered no (20%), while two respondents offered alternative approaches (8%). 
 
                                                     
15 For example, please refer to our report to the Council of Europe on a possible update of the Council of Europe 
Recommendation Rec(2004)11, November 2013 and references (see fn. 3 above) 




4.5.1 Positive answers and other arguments 
Most respondents agreed on introducing the concepts of risks and risk assessment in the 
updated Recommendation (including the two who offered alternative approaches). 
However, respondents have different understandings of "risk", "risk assessment" and how to 
introduce them. Their arguments can be grouped as follows: 
With reference to risks  
1. the existence of so many potential risks means that it might prove difficult to agree 
on what to include; 
2. a very generic wording making sure a proper risk assessment is being made and that 
it is made public can be envisaged; 
3. if it is decided to shift towards a hierarchical/nested structure of the 
Recommendation, it is reasonable that a Risk Policy Layer is added; 
4. different levels of risk management policies shall be developed and various types of 
risks addressed; 
5. the updated Recommendation should include a list of potential risks identified by 
Council of Europe states that already use e-voting. Such a list needs to be updated 
often;  
6. Criteria on procedures, methods and regularity of risk assessment should be part of 
"lower-level" recommendations that need more frequent updates and greater 
flexibility to take into account local specificities. 
With reference to the level of risk 
7. e-voting should as a minimum not pose higher risks to electoral integrity than paper 
voting; 
8. distinguish between technically (in)acceptable risks and politically (in)acceptable 
risks. 
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With reference to risk assessment 
9. Complete E2E testing and preliminary analysis of software code to be introduced as a 
risk-assessment procedure; 
10. Refer to International IDEA’s Election Risk Management (ERM) tool16; 
11. Include risk assessment and management in every stage of project management. A 
risk assessment management which defines possible threats with respect to security, 
logistical and legal aspects. Develop risk management templates that assess different 
risk sources that affect e-voting and include them in the updated Recommendation; 
12. the relationship between the system owner and the entity performing the risk 
assessment would be an issue; 
13. Notions of risk should be based on experiences and not only on academic research. 
4.5.2 Negative answers  
Those who replied negatively to the question argued the following: 
With reference to the formulation of provisions 
1. Keep the absolute terms "shall secure... shall be able to...." as a mean to ensure 
security and transparency; 
2. One argument explains that "shall" as used in laws expresses what is mandatory. At 
the same time it contests that in the Recommendation the use of "shall" means that 
the system should be able to fulfil this goal. The goal to be achieved is absolute 
alone. As an alternative, this opinion suggests the introduction of a Common Criteria 
Protection profile instead of the proposed solution; 
3. Another respondent prefers to keep the Recommendation in absolute terms and 
point to compliance when evaluating. 
With reference to the notion of the acceptable level of risk 
4. Introducing permissible "acceptable" risk or error thresholds appears inacceptable 
and politically impossible to achieve. What is acceptable: 1%, 5%, 10%...?; 
Alternative solutions 
5. One respondent says that the Recommendation should instead focus on the 
responsibilities of EMBs and on ways to make sure that these responsibilities are 
respected as a risk minimisation technique; 
6. Another opinion recognizes the importance of risk management, however does not 
deem it necessary to be included in the Recommendation. 
No respondent truly opposes the notions of risk and risk assessment. Opinions diverge with 
respect to changing the language of the provisions (some would like to keep the absolute 
terms even if this means that total compliance will be impossible to achieve) or introducing 
thresholds of acceptable risk. There is a proposal to approach the problem not from the 
                                                     
16 IDEA ERM Tool, available at: <http://www.idea.int/elections/ermtool/> [Last accessed 07/10/2015] 
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perspective of risk but from the one of making sure that EMBs respect their responsibilities. 
Both alternative proposals agree with the notions of risk and risk assessment.  
4.6 Question 6 on additional preliminary questions 
Are there other questions which you think need to be decided beforehand? 
Question 6 aims at identifying other potential issues that would need to be decided 
beforehand. Seven (7) respondents suggested considering the following issues: 
Referring to security 
1. in addition to the security of e-voting software, also examine the security of 
procedures and the security of supports  
2. introduce internal controls of the system 
Referring to certification 
3. develop a Common Criteria Protection Profile based on the existing 
Recommendation and a formal certification procedure 
4. include a description of procedures to obtain certification of electronic voting 
systems; 
5. establish a certification body within the Council of Europe 
Other proposals 
6. inform on estimated costs regarding the use of e-voting (to be included in the 
explanatory note); 
7. inform on the frequency of updates of complementary layers. According to the 
respondent, this may have an impact on the level of detail and specificity that they 
can contain and the scope they leave for local or temporal adoption. 
These are discussed in the conclusions (chapter 5 below). One representative suggested that 
proposals for the update of the Recommendation be presented in a form that helps 
visualising options. This has been considered when drafting the proposals (see chapter 6).  
4.7 Question 7 on expectations related to the update 
What are your expectations in relation to the future update of Rec(2004)11 ? 
Twenty (20) respondents expressed expectations related to the update of the 
Recommendation. Their answers have been considered here with a view to come up with a 
set of guiding principles for the update works of the Recommendation. They are summarized 
below: 
Focus on key hard-core provisions 
1. broad enough to include the different methods of e-voting, clear enough to provide a 
solid working basis; 
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2. bring to a higher level the e-voting standards set in the Recommendation by aligning 
them with the latest technical and legal developments in the field of e-voting; 
3. contribute to uniform standards in national e-voting legislation of member states; 
4. more concise, clear, inclusive, technology neutral and future proof 
recommendations; 
A clear and well-structured Recommendation 
5. more simple and clear the definitions; 
6. improvement of structure allowing for a better interpretation of the individual 
recommendations;  
7. no mix of high-level (objectives, principles) and low-level recommendations;  
8. standards that do not seem important should be avoided to keep the document 
concise; 
Practice oriented… 
9. make the Recommendation more applicable; 
10. a revised, legible text. Maintain the current attractive character and ease of use; 
11. clear guidelines and clear responsibilities of all stakeholders; 
12. guidance for  EMBs to develop  or evaluate their own processes of implementing new 
methods of casting a vote; 
13. easy to apply for election officials, observers and e-voting equipment manufacturers; 
14. no recommendations that are impossible to fulfil; 
Enhancement, not rewriting of the current Recommendation 
15. just an update of the existing Recommendation; 
16. preserve and build on the existing e-voting standards; 
Flexible standards 
17. close attention to the details, especially in terms of flexibility and adaptability of 
certain parts of the Recommendation (digital authentication of persons, 
cryptography, increasing risks of cyber – attacks); 
18. find a reasonable balance between the need for both high-level recommendations 
and detailed provisions or concrete examples. Without the latter the 
Recommendation will not be very useful. The challenge is to select viable enough 
details or concrete examples that do not need frequent updates; 
19. future updates are easier to implement;  
Sensitive to the political and social environment 
20. introduction and use of new terms, such as trust (or confidence) and trustworthiness; 
21. include risk management aspects; 
22. stronger focus on information and communication policies; 
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Ambitious: broad geographical scope 
23. offer guidance beyond the Council of Europe borders. 
4.8 Question 8 on additional remarks 
Do you have any other remark or suggestion? 
Eight (8) respondents submitted additional remarks with one (Switzerland) making a quite 
detailed proposal for the organisation of the new recommendation. Respondents focused 
on: 
Proposed novelties  
1. include the advantages/disadvantages of using an e-voting system based on past 
experience;  
2. address points that may expose voters exercising their right to vote from abroad via 
e-voting to considerable risk (namely in relation to the use of cryptography) ; 
3. provide guidance on the issue of conflict of interest when introducing, operating and 
verifying e-solutions; 
4. address the issue of identification and authentication of the voters (Online Voting) ; 
5. recommend a phased approach when introducing e-voting; 
6. recommend discussion with the major stakeholders ; 
7. recommend information campaign, publicity, etc. ; 
8. a neutral Recommendation when it comes to the introduction of e‐voting; 
9. a detailed proposal for a new structure (see Switzerland's reply to the last question) ; 
Existing provisions 
10. request not to destroy the existing Recommendation; 
11. add a requirement in the Recommendation itself (currently in the Guideline on 
transparency) that the source code of election software (and hardware 
documentation as far as possible) should be made accessible in appropriate time 
before the elections at least to the participating parties/candidates (or even better to 
all to see) so that they may analyse this themselves in due time well ahead of the 
voting day.  
These proposals should be revisited when updating the individual provisions. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
5.1 Scope 
Regarding the scope of the updated Recommendation, the replies on 1) definition of e-
voting; 2) role of EMBs; and 5) risk policy can be assessed as follows. 
5.1.1 Definition of e-voting 
There is consensus on the following points: 
1. A system that provides for "at least the casting of the vote" by electronic means, also 
does the e-counting of the e-votes collected. Such e-counting is already covered by 
the definition of e-voting of Rec(2004)11; 
2. E-voting's definition can be extended to include, in addition to systems that provide 
for "at least the casting of the vote" by electronic means (i.e. e-voting machines and 
internet voting) also ballot scanners where the voter "casts" a paper ballot directly 
into the scanning device and may optionally receive direct feedback from the 
machine on who they voted for, for review or verification purposes. This is accepted 
by the great majority of "yes" and "no" respondents;  
3. The scope of the Recommendation should not be extended to cover other e-enabled 
steps of the organisation of elections (e.g. electronic election administration systems, 
voter registration or identification systems). The link between the "use of 
electronics" and the "casting of the vote" is maintained; 
4. The non-binding use of e-voting systems or their use outside political referendums 
and elections should continue to fall outside the scope of the Recommendation (e.g. 
e-collecting will be excluded).  
This is in line with the objective of the current update which is for Rec(2004)11 to become 
more specific rather than more general.  
A majority of respondents seems to exclude ballot scanners that operate outside the 
"voting", such as scanners used in precinct or central counting centres for counting purposes 
alone (i.e. there is no interaction voter-scanner), from the scope of e-voting as defined in the 
Recommendation.  
Alternatively, according at least to one "no" respondent, such e-counting could be included 
but should be treated separately and the accent put on its specific challenges, namely the 
integrity of the tally and the related distribution of seats. 
In all cases, the Recommendation should distinguish between provisions that are general to 
all e-voting methods considered and those that are specific to e-voting machines, ballot 
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5.1.2 Role of EMBs 
There seems to be consensus among respondents and independent experts that the role of 
e-voting vendors is a very serious problem which must be carefully thought out. One issue 
relates to the balance between the right of a vendor to have trade secrets and the public's 
right to a transparent election process.  
The possible role of other public, semi-private or private entities like political parties, NGOs, 
individual observers etc. also needs special attention according to independent experts.  
However it is also clear that the Recommendation should be shortened and become more 
concise rather than longer and more detailed. 
The same problem can be approached from another angle: the role and responsibilities of 
the state authorities in charge of elections and referendums (or EMBs) when using e-voting.  
Whether they are satisfied with the existing provisions of the Recommendation or whether 
they would like to stress the responsibility of EMBs - as proposed by a majority of 18 
respondents - all opinions agree that the organisation of elections and referendums is the 
exclusive responsibility of the designated state authority and that this last one should have 
absolute control over all voting methods, including e-voting.  
The majority of respondents who accepted to introduce a provision on the role of EMBs also 
suggested provisions on: 
Identifying, selecting, controlling, vendors and clearly defining responsibilities 
1. identify all aspects of an e-vote that are (will go) under the effective control (even 
partial) of private vendors/service providers; 
2. introduce procedures for selecting vendors/service providers;  
3. introduce procedures that the state authority should follow to evaluate and approve 
the e-voting services proposed by vendors/service providers;  
4. clarify respective roles and responsibilities during the implementation phase;  
Conducting external controls 
5. stress the importance of audits and other external controls as proof of the effective 
exercise of their responsibility by EMBs; 
Creating and/or strengthening internal capacities 
6. clarify authorities' ability to monitor technical issues and hold their suppliers to 
account and 
7. state the need for the authorities to continuously "upgrade" their capacities to keep 
real control on the e-vote;  
8. state the aim of having authorities gradually reduce outsourcing by increasing 
internal capacities; 
Introducing transparency 
9. clarify ownership of the source code by the authorities;  
10. clarify disclosure of the source code to ensure public control;  
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11. independent evaluation of e-voting systems 
12. publish information on evaluators and results of evaluation. 
It is clear that, given the national specific regulations on the organisation of elections, the 
Recommendation can only regulate the responsibility of authorities broadly. References to 
national legislation may need to be added.  
5.1.3 Introducing the notion of risk 
The proposed clarification of the notions of risk and risk assessment has the following 
objective: make sure that the provisions are implementable or feasible which is not always 
the case with the current Recommendation.  
One respondent suggested that political parties in his country consider the introduction of e-
voting as high risk and therefore prefer to move with caution.  
It is important to clarify here that the discussion on the notion of risk as well as any other 
discussion in this report should not be interpreted as an encouragement to use e-voting. The 
Recommendation is neutral with respect to the introduction of this voting method and there 
are no indications that this may change. The aim here is to clarify, as much as this can be 
done at the regional level, the criteria for using e-voting so that the authorities can make 
informed decisions when required to do so.  
Stating in the Recommendation that e-voting (as any other voting method) carries risks and 
underlying the need to introduce risk assessments when envisaging introducing e-voting 
would presumably contribute towards the adoption of better informed decisions. 
It is clear that the Recommendation does not (and cannot) aim at introducing risk or error 
thresholds for the whole region.  
Introducing the notions of risk and risk assessment means first of all to update the 
formulation of the provisions. The aim is to have provisions that can be implemented.  
In a second step, it may imply - as suggested by the majority of respondents - introducing a 
list of "basic" threats that need to be addressed for each e-voting method and on which it 
may be possible to have consensus (an independent expert suggested for example that such 
threat could include the secure platform problem or not trusting one single server in the 
case of internet voting for instance). Such lists may be included in the lower-level related 
documents. 
The Common Criteria Protection Profile need to be carefully thought out and should be 
discussed when updating the individual provisions. 
However, it should be clarified here that the introduction of such a norm does not contradict 
the inclusion of notions of risk and risk assessment in the Recommendation. 
The Common Criteria Protection Profile typically specifies the Evaluation Assurance Level 
(EAL), a number 1 through 7, indicating the depth and rigor of the security evaluation, usually 
in the form of supporting documentation and testing, that a product meets the security 
requirements specified in the Protection Profile PP.17 Obtaining the highest level of 
certification (EAL 7) for instance means, at best, that 100% of checks and controls foreseen 
for EAL7 were conducted successfully. This is certainly important and demonstrates that the 
                                                     
17 Protection Profile: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protection_Profile> [Last accessed 07/10/2015] 
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system respects "state of the art" requirements. Unfortunately this does not mean that the 
system will be 100% secure when used in real life. In other words, successful certification is 
no guarantee of 100% security.  
The same can be said with respect to end-to-end verifiability. It is also judged to be 
indispensable even if it does not guarantee the security of the system. It may guarantee that 
possible security-related problems will be detected. Such "problem-detection" guarantee 
does not exist in paper-based traditional voting methods.  
The concepts of verifiability, certification, etc. as used in the Recommendation need to be 
updated in the light of the new understanding that we have of them.  
Admitting that certification, verifiability, audits, etc. do contribute to having a "state-of-the-
art" e-voting system but do not guarantee that such a system is 100% secure when used, 
means that risk remains present and should be dealt by updating the formulation of the 
provisions, maybe by introducing a risk assessment layer, by communicating, etc.  
To build trust it is important to publish the identity of those who conduct the risk 
assessment as well as the results. 
Keeping the actual "absolute" and "strong" formulation of some provisions as suggested by 
one respondent does not seem defendable as it means that the provision will continue to be 
impossible to fulfil. The underlying motivation of aiming towards a maximum of security, 
transparency, etc., is understandable and right. Clarifying the meaning of provisions and 
making sure that they can be implemented will presumably contribute to greater security. 
5.2 Structure 
5.2.1 Structure of the Recommendation 
The structure of the future Recommendation is examined in questions 3.1 and 3.2. Question 
3.1 proposes that the Recommendation contains only high-level provisions which are stable 
over time. Lower-level / detailed provisions should be included in related but lower-level and 
thus easier to update instruments, like the Guidelines according to question 3.2.  
Those who agree with the proposals as well as those who present alternative opinions agree 
that it is necessary to restructure the Recommendation to distinguish between: 
1. higher- vs. lower-level provisions 
2. more "mandatory" vs. less "mandatory" provisions (although as mentioned the 
Recommendation itself is not mandatory but part of soft-law) 
3. stable vs. need more frequent updates 
4. general vs. specific (more detailed) provisions, and further 
a. specific to controlled environments and  
b. specific to uncontrolled environments. 
Furthermore the mentioned categories overlap. Thus : 
¾ higher level provisions are more "mandatory", general and stable 
Page 30 of 39 
 
¾ lower level provisions are less "mandatory", as well as specific and need more 
frequent updates. 
Whether such distinction is made within the same document or by putting some standards 
in separate documents needs to be thought out in the light mainly of the updating 
possibilities.  
Fear of lesser respect for lower level, less mandatory provisions is understandable however 
one should remind that in general the Recommendation and the related documents are 
there to offer guidance and are not mandatory as such.  
One argument in favour of splitting the requirements in different documents is to facilitate 
updates. More "mandatory", standards which are also rather general and more stable can go 
into the Recommendation itself which is a higher level document. Practice shows that the 
Recommendation cannot be changed often. 
Less "mandatory" standards which happen to be more specific and to need more regular 
updates can go in lower level documents such as the existing Guidelines. Such lower-level 
documents complete the Recommendation. They are expected to be updated more easily 
and frequently than the Recommendation.  
The relation between provisions found in higher and lower level documents is to be made 
clear so that those seeking guidance in the Recommendation for instance will also find 
reference to the complementary provisions contained in the related instruments. 
Thought may be given to the proposal to leave the Recommendation unchanged and create 
a Common Criteria Protection Profile based on existing standards in Appendix III. This work is 
however, the respondent argues, better done outside the Council of Europe. We are not 
convinced that the Recommendation, as it stands, offers all information necessary to create 
such a profile. Indeed the update will help achieve this. Furthermore, it is not clear what 
impact such a profile will have in other countries, or how to generalize such impact.  
5.2.2 Categories of requirements 
A majority of independent experts and a majority of respondents agree with the proposal to 
regroup requirements as follows:  
(I) what a system is required to do (functional) 
(II) how it should meet the requirement (performance) and  
(III) how to test and evaluate that requirements are met (testing and evaluation criteria).  
One reaction to the argument that any new classification is arbitrary is to say that the 
proposed structure stems from evaluation of past experiences and research. It appears to 
better respond to the needs of those who build e-voting systems and those who evaluate or 
control them.  
The argument saying that functional requirements cannot be included as no size fits all is 
certainly based on a different understanding of the said functional requirements. It is 
understood that only functional requirements applicable throughout the region are to be 
included in the new Recommendation. Such requirements stem directly from legal principles 
applicable to e-voting. Other, country-specific functional requirements will not be included.  
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Thought could be given to alternative classifications and their respective advantages. The 
aim is to come up with a Recommendation which is easy to use by the authorities 
responsible for elections and referendums, by those who build or evaluate e-voting systems. 
With reference to the stated objective of updating the Recommendation rather than re-
writing it, the suggestion of keeping the current classification and extending it by putting 
functional requirements in Appendix I, performance requirements in Appendix II and testing 
and performance requirements in Appendix III is not very different from our proposal if it is 
admitted that a number of standards should be displaced from one appendix to another, in 
addition to other clarifications.  
5.3 Further suggestions 
The respondents proposed a number of additional preliminary questions to be examined on 
security, certification and other (see question 6 in chapter 4). 
Such proposals are not really preliminary questions that need to be decided before the 
updating works but rather suggestions that will be taken into account when updating the 
individual provisions.  
With respect to estimated costs of e-voting, there is no agreement on a method of 
calculation of e-voting costs. A common method for the calculation of costs needs to be 
agreed before any cost estimation can be suggested.  
With respect to the frequency of updates of complementary layers, this cannot be estimated 
a priori. However, what is most important is not a fixed agenda of updates but rather the 
possibility of undertaking updates whenever deemed necessary. Whether there is need or 
not to update certain documents, this could be discussed at the biennial meetings.  
The list of expectations related to the update and the list of other remarks (questions 7 and 
8) are long ones which however do not require any decision for the time being. Expectations 
and suggestions by the countries should be revisited when updating the individual 
provisions. 
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6. PROPOSALS 
Based on the analysis of the replies received, for each issue a number of options (solutions) 
are proposed below. They are submitted to the ad-hoc Committee for consideration and 
decision. Options that seem to better suit the majority of countries have been underlined 
(bordered blue).  
6.1 Definition of e-voting 
In terms of the definition of e-voting, it will have to be decided whether the definition 
remains unchanged or whether it is modified and how.  
Proposals can be grouped in four categories:  
(A) keep the current definition;  
(B) extend it to include scanners used by voters to "cast" their paper vote. They record the 
vote and also do the counting;  
(C) further extend it to include scanners used only for counting purposes in the voting 
precinct. In this case there is no interaction between the scanner and the voter; 
(D) further extend it to include scanners used for counting purposes outside the voting 
precinct (e.g. in central counting centres).  
B appears to be the most consensual solution. In this case the current definition is expanded 
to include scanners that record and count in electronic format paper ballots. Such scanners 
are used in voting precincts. To the extent that the voter enters (casts) her paper ballot in 
the machine, receives feedback from the machine and there is a paper trail available for 
possible recounts, these are not purely e-counting machines.  
The other two solutions C and D include furthermore pure counting machines used in voting 
precincts (C) or in central counting centres (D). Such devices never enter in contact with the 
voter. Several respondents suggest that they are/may be regulated differently.  
 
 Casting of electronic ballots 
Electronically 







A 9    
B 9 9   
C 9 9 9  
D 9 9 9 9 
Figure 6 
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6.2 Responsibility of EMBs 
A decision needs to be taken to add or not a broad provision reminding that the conduct of 
elections and referenda and thus responsibility over voting methods, including e-voting, 
stays with the EMB/state authority in charge of elections and referendums.  
Following proposals are available: 
A. Current situation 
B. Introduce a broad provision reminding that the conduct of elections and referenda 
and thus responsibility over voting methods, including e-voting, stays with the 
EMB/state authority in charge of elections and referendums. 
C. In addition to introducing (B.) also add detailed provisions (possibly on a separate 
"layer") on identifying, selecting, controlling vendors, organizing external controls, 
issues of transparency, internal capacities, etc. (requires further discussion in the 
framework of the CAHVE) 
D. In addition to introducing (B.) also include a reference to national regulations 
(requires further discussion in the framework of the CAHVE) 
 
 Current situation Broad provision Detailed regulation Reference to national regulations 
A 9    
B  9   
C  9 9  
D  9  9 
Figure 7 
 
Judging from the answers to the questionnaire, options B and probably D are the more 
consensual.  
6.3 Notion of risk 
With respect to risk, following choices are available:  
A. current situation;  
B. update the language of provisions; 
C. add a list of commonly accepted threats for each voting method.  
D. In addition, introduce transparency and communication measures.  
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A 9    
B  9   
C  9 9  
D  9 9 9 
Figure 8 
 
Options B and C seem to be the preferred ones. 
6.4 Structure of the Recommendation 
There is wide acceptance on the decision to distinguish, in the future Recommendation, 
requirements that are general to all e-voting forms from ones that are specific to e-voting in 
controlled vs. uncontrolled environments, and within these to categories, to different forms 
of e-voting (direct record electronic voting machines [with or without VVPAT], ballot 
scanners that record paper votes, internet voting from an uncontrolled computer, internet 
voting from a controlled computer) (controlled or uncontrolled by the state authority in 








A 9   
B  9  
C   9 
Figure 9 
 
With respect to the structure of the future recommendation following choices are available: 
A. current situation 
B. one document (the Recommendation) but introduce layers 
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C. put the main provisions in the Recommendations and the other ones in other, 
complementary documents, expected to be more easily updated. 
The last option seems to receive a majority backing.  
6.5 Categories of requirements 
There is some choice between: 
A. the current situation 
B. regroup the existing standards in new categories: 
a. What a system is required to do? (functional) 
b. How the requirement is to be met? (performance) 
c. How to test and evaluate conformity with requirements? (evaluation, testing) 
C. keep current appendices/classification and integrate new categories in the existing 
legal, operational and technical appendices (a mixture of solutions A and B). 
 
 Current categories New categories (a,b,c) 
Mixture of A and B (keep 
current appendices and 
integrate new categories (B 
a,b,c) there 
A 9   
B  9  
C   9 
Figure 10 
 
B seems most consensual followed by C.  
6.6 Other decisions 
A. Standards to be found both in the Recommendation itself and in the related 
Guidelines on Certification and Transparency are to be considered during the 
updating works; the future document/s (Recommendation and, possibly, additional 
related documents) will replace the current Recommendation and the current 
Guidelines on Certification and Transparency? Yes / No / Other 
B. Introduce a clause foreseeing the future update of the standards; standards both in 
the Recommendation and in the related documents need to be updated whenever 
necessary; decisions on the necessity and modalities of updates can be considered at 
the biannual review meetings? Yes / No / Other 
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ANNEX I: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS BY QUESTION18 
 
Question 1: Definition of e-voting 
Should e-voting be re-defined to include, in addition to electronic voting machines and 
internet voting, also ballot scanners? 
Yes No Other 
18 6 1 
*n/a means no answer was provided 
 
Question 2: Role of Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) 
While leaving detailed definitions to the parts specifically dealing with issues such as 
transparency, auditing, verifiability, etc. would you agree to add a broad recommendation, 
reminding that the conduct of elections and referenda is the responsibility of EMBs/state 
authorities, in the revised Recommendation? 
Yes No Other n/a 
18 2 4 1 
 
Question 3/1: Structure of the future Recommendation 
Do you agree with putting only high-level concise recommendations that are persistent over 
time in the Recommendation itself? The Recommendation would be stable. 
Yes No Other 
21 3 1 
 
Question 3/2: Structure of the future Recommendation 
Do you agree with organizing the other detailed recommendations in separate, 
complementary layers/documents (specific for e.g. to certification, auditing, verifiability...) 
that need to be regularly updated? It is understood that the relationship between high-level 
and detailed recommendations and their nesting will be made clear. It is understood that 
the different documents (Recommendation and complementary layers/documents) are 
interrelated and interdependent. 
Yes No Other 
20* 3 2 
* the "yes and no" reply of CDDG C. has been considered a yes. 
 
                                                     
18 For Belgium 2 votes have been counted for each question given that both federal and region Brussels authorities replied 
to the questionnaire and most of their replies differ. For CDDG 3 votes have been counted for each question because they 
presented three different replies: A, B, C.  
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Question 4: Categories of requirements (recommendations) 
Do you agree with a reorganization of the recommendations and classification in new 
categories which include functional requirements (what an e-voting system is required to 
do), performance requirements (how an e-voting system should do what it is required to do) 
and  testing and evaluation criteria? 
Yes No Other 
18 2 5 
 
Question 5: Risk policy  
Do you agree with the inclusion of the notions of risk and risk assessment in the updated 
(hard core) Recommendation? 
Yes No Other 
18 5 2 
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ANNEX II: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS BY RESPONDENT 
 
Country Q1 Q2 Q3/1 Q3/2 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Armenia yes no yes yes yes yes no yes no 
Austria yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a n/a n/a 
Belgium 
(Federal State) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes no 
Belgium 
(Brussels Reg)  
no no no no yes no yes yes yes 
Bulgaria yes other yes yes yes yes no yes no 
Croatia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Czech Republic yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a n/a n/a 
Denmark no yes yes yes no no no yes no 
Estonia yes yes yes yes yes no n/a n/a n/a 
Finland yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a n/a n/a 
Georgia yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes no 
Greece no yes yes yes yes yes n/a n/a n/a 
Hungary yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
Lithuania other yes yes yes other other n/a yes yes 
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Country Q1 Q2 Q3/1 Q3/2 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Malta yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a yes yes 
Russia yes Yes* yes yes other no yes yes no 
Spain yes other yes yes yes yes no yes no 
Sweden yes other yes other other other yes yes n/a 
Switzerland yes yes other other other yes no yes yes 
Turkey yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a yes n/a 
 
CDDG A. no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CDDG B. no yes no no no no yes yes yes 
CDDG C. no n/a no yes* yes yes no yes no 
CDMSI yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a yes n/a 
International 
IDEA 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes n/a 
 
*interpreted 
